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Luck, Insurance, and Equality*
Michael Otsuka
Some people are the victims of luck—that is, of the effect of events and
things beyond their control—that is both bad and worse than the luck
of others. This is a problem for egalitarians, since luck is at the source
of many of the differences in the circumstances of individuals. But egal-
itarians are not bothered by every variety of luck. Ronald Dworkin, for
example, has drawn a distinction between two types of luck—“option luck”
and “brute luck”—and has argued that the former does not necessarily
give rise to inequalities that are unjust.1 Option luck, as he defines it, is
“a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether
someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should
have anticipated and might have declined.” Brute luck, by contrast, is “a
matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.”2
* I would like to thank G. A. Cohen, David Copp, Ronald Dworkin, Susan Hurley,
Joseph Raz, John Roemer, Seana Shiffrin, Peter Vallentyne, and Andrew Williams for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank the members of the
audiences at the University of California, Davis, the University of Pavia, and the University
of London, where I presented earlier versions of this article, for their comments.
1. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), esp. chap. 2, pp. 73–83. All references to this book
include chapter as well as page numbers. I refer to chapters because two of the chapters
that I cite are reprints of previously published articles. Chapter 2 was originally published
as “What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981):
283–345, and chap. 3 was originally published as “What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of
Liberty,” Iowa Law Review 73 (1987): 1–54. A third chapter I cite—chap. 6—is a revised
and abridged version of “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” which was originally published
in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 11, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 1990).
2. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 2, p. 73. Dworkin illustrates this distinction as follows:
“If I buy a stock on the exchange that rises, then my option luck is good. If I am hit by a
falling meteorite whose course could not have been predicted, then my bad luck is brute
(even though I could have moved just before it struck if I had any reason to know where it
would strike)” (ibid). As I understand the concept, option luck is a property of a choice that
makes sense only when that choice is compared with another choice. Imagine that I have
one thousand dollars, that only three choices are now available to me, and that the risks
associated with each are known to me: (1) to place it in a savings account at low interest,
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“It is a ruling principle of equality,” declares Dworkin, “that it is unjust
when some people lead their lives with less wealth available to them, or
in otherwise less favorable circumstances, than others, not through some
choice or gamble of their own but through brute bad luck.”3 The gov-
ernment should not, however, eliminate differences in people’s circum-
stances that can be traced purely to option luck, since Dworkin also
endorses a principle which “demands that government work, . . . so far
as it can achieve this, to make [citizens’] fates sensitive to the choices
they have made.”4
So long as we restrict ourselves to those who had equivalent op-
portunities to expose themselves to risk and who could easily have cho-
sen an alternative in which they were exposed to no risk at all, Dworkin’s
claim is highly plausible that differences in circumstances which arise
solely from differences in option luck are consistent with egalitarian
justice. To illustrate the plausibility of this claim when so restricted, let
us suppose that equally wealthy and capable individuals are presented
with an equal opportunity to gamble in a casino. Suppose further that
nobody is a compulsive gambler and that everyone could live a life
comfortably free of risk in the absence of gambles. Egalitarian justice
would not be violated in these circumstances when some grow richer
than others because they have made high-stakes gambles at roulette that
others could have made but chose not to. Nor would it be violated when
two people make equally risky high-stakes gambles at roulette, and one
wins and the other loses.5
There are, however, many cases in which people are exposed to
unchosen risks which they cannot or know not how to avoid, and these
are risks of grave harms which are difficult to repair or compensate in
other ways. Among them are the risks of coming down with diseases
such as Alzheimer’s or schizophrenia or of suffering comparably grave
injuries on account of unforeseeable natural catastrophes. There are
many more risks of grave harm that people can avoid only at great cost,
such as the risks associated with walking, cycling, and automated trans-
portation. Dworkin has maintained that, if each person had an “equal
opportunity to insure” against these and other risks of harm, they “would
(2) to purchase stock, or (3) to bet it all on a single number on a roulette wheel. Assume
that the stock rises at a rate higher than the rate of interest on the savings and that another
number comes up in roulette. If I choose 2, then my option luck is good with respect to
each of 1 and 3. If I choose 3, then it is bad with respect to each of 1 and 2. If I choose 1,
then it is good with respect to 3 but bad with respect to 2.
3. Ibid., chap. 9, p. 347. Chapter 9 contains previously unpublished reflections on
the theory of equality of resources, which presumably reflect Dworkin’s views at the time
of publication of Sovereign Virtue.
4. Ibid., “Introduction,” p. 6.
5. For Dworkin’s persuasive defense of the compatibility of voluntary gambling with
egalitarian justice, see ibid., chap. 2, pp. 74–76.
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pose no special problem for equality of resources”—where “equality of
resources” is the name of his own theory of egalitarian justice. He stip-
ulates that people have an equal opportunity to insure against a harm
when the following three conditions are met: each person has the same
risk of suffering such harm, each knows roughly how great this risk is,
and each has an ample opportunity to purchase insurance provided by
the free market against such harm.6
Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources calls for the equalization,
among other things, of those resources that are external to the indi-
vidual and a part of the world: “impersonal resources.”7 He also main-
tains that a person’s physical and mental capacities are to be regarded
as resources for the purposes of his theory. He calls these “personal
resources.”8 The ambition of his theory of equality of resources is to
ensure that no one envies anyone else’s bundle of impersonal and per-
sonal resources.9 Such envy will be absent, and hence the distribution
of resources will pass an “envy test,” so long as no one prefers anyone
else’s bundle of impersonal and personal resources, over his or her
lifetime, to his or her own.10 This test might be satisfied even though
the capacities of some are recognized by all to be superior to those of
others. When capacities are unequal, impersonal resources are to be
redistributed to compensate for such differences.11
It is the aim of this article to refute Dworkin’s claim that the pro-
vision of an equal opportunity to insure against risks is sufficient to
render differences in people’s circumstances that are the result of luck
consistent with his theory of equality of resources. Section I addresses
bad brute luck in the circumstances of individuals which is the result
of the vicissitudes of nature, whereas Section II addresses bad brute luck
which is the result of the choices of other individuals.
6. Ibid., p. 77. As I understand Dworkin, one has an “ample opportunity” to insure
if one has the opportunity to purchase insurance from a range of differently priced
insurance policies that are economically feasible for insurers to provide and that offer
various levels of compensation for the harm in question (see ibid., secs. III–VI).
7. See ibid. Dworkin introduces the term “impersonal resources” in ibid., chap. 9,
pp. 322–23.
8. See ibid., chap. 9, p. 322.
9. Dworkin writes that “the general ambition of equality of resources . . . is to make
circumstances equal under an appropriate version of the envy test” (ibid., chap. 3, p. 141).
He defines circumstances to include “[impersonal] resources, talents and capacities” (ibid.,
p. 140).
10. See ibid., chap. 2, p. 85.
11. Dworkin maintains that capacities may not themselves be redistributed or oth-
erwise manipulated or transferred (see ibid., p. 80).
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I
Are there any good grounds to believe that luck would be rendered
unproblematic from the point of view of equality of resources by the
provision of an equal opportunity to insure? Consider the following
positive answer to this question, which rests on an appeal to Dworkin’s
claim that “insurance, so far as it is available, provides a link between
brute and option luck, because the decision to buy or reject catastrophe
insurance is a calculated gamble.”12 In chapter 2 of Sovereign Virtue,
Dworkin maintains that having an equal opportunity to insure against
known risks transforms any differences in fortune which are the result
of such risks into differences in option luck, which are unproblematic
from the standpoint of equality of resources, rather than differences in
brute luck. He asks the reader to imagine that two sighted people have
an equal, and known, chance of becoming blind, and each has the
opportunity to purchase one of a range of insurance policies that are
economically feasible for insurers to provide and that offer various de-
grees of compensation for blindness.13 He asks us to assume that one
of them chooses to insure and the other does not. Dworkin claims that
equality of resources “would not argue for redistribution from the per-
son who had insured to the person who had not if, horribly, they were
both blinded in the same accident. For the availability of insurance
would mean that, though they had both had brute bad luck, the dif-
ference between them was a matter of option luck.” He contends, more-
over, that “the situation cannot be different if the person who decided
not to insure is the only one to be blinded. For once again the difference
is a difference in option luck against a background of equal opportunity
to insure or not.”14 Here Dworkin is claiming that, just as it is the case
that any difference in fortune between the two individuals is attributable
to option luck alone when both are blinded, it is the case that any
difference in fortune between the two individuals is attributable to op-
tion luck alone when only one is blinded.15 It follows from Dworkin’s
12. Ibid, p. 74.
13. See ibid., pp. 76–77.
14. Ibid., p. 77.
15. Elsewhere, however, Dworkin denies that the provision of an equal opportunity
to insure fully transforms brute luck into option luck. He writes in the previously unpub-
lished reflections on his theory of equality of resources in chapter 9 of Sovereign Virtue
that the “effect of the hypothetical insurance strategy is not to eliminate the consequences
of brute bad luck . . . but only to mitigate it to the degree and in the way that prudent
insurance normally does” (ibid., chap. 9, p. 341). Even in his original presentation of the
theory reprinted in chap. 2, Dworkin appears at one point to deny that the equal op-
portunity to insure fully transforms brute luck into option luck. Directly following the
quoted sentence attached to n. 12 above, Dworkin writes: “Of course, insurance does not
erase the distinction [between brute and option luck]. Someone who buys medical in-
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commitment to the preservation of differences that can be traced solely
to option luck that it would be unfair to take from someone who insured
against blindness but does not go blind in order to give to someone
who failed to insure and goes blind.
I agree with Dworkin that when both persons are blinded, any
resulting difference in their (personal or impersonal) resources is at-
tributable to option luck alone, since their brute luck is identical. Yet
I deny that the difference in circumstances which arises when only one
goes blind is necessarily attributable to option luck alone. I deny this
because I believe that an equal opportunity to insure is not sufficient
to transform all differences arising from known risks into differences
in option rather than brute luck in a large class of cases in which (unlike
cases of gambling in casinos) one couldn’t (or couldn’t without great
cost) avoid the risks. This class includes all those cases in which no
insurance policy exists that it would be reasonable to purchase and that
would fully compensate the harm, where “full compensation” is under-
stood as an amount of money awarded that would make the person
indifferent between (1) that amount of money plus the harm and (2)
the absence of that amount plus the absence of the harm. No such
policy would exist (1) if it were impossible fully to compensate the
harm16 or (2) if, although it is possible fully to compensate the harm,
the cost of purchasing such insurance that compensates fully were (2a)
beyond the capacity of the individual to purchase17 or (2b) within his
or her capacity to purchase yet unreasonably expensive.18
An equal opportunity to insure would, by contrast, be sufficient to
surance and is hit by an unexpected meteorite still suffers brute bad luck, because he is
worse off than if he had bought insurance and not needed it. But he has had better
option luck than if he had not bought the insurance, because his situation is better in
virtue of his not having run the gamble of refusing to insure” (ibid., chap. 2, p. 74). This
denial is both inconsistent with his remarks about the blinded individuals and difficult to
reconcile with his claim that risks of harm pose no special problem for equality of resources
when people have an equal opportunity to insure.
16. Ailments such as blindness or insanity might be impossible fully to compensate
because no amount of money could purchase a cure, treatment, and/or supply of other
things which money can buy, which in turn would make an individual indifferent between
a situation in which he or she was never afflicted by the ailment and one in which he or
she is afflicted by the ailment but it is remedied or offset by the monetary award.
17. Insurance would be beyond the capacity of an individual to purchase if the com-
bined assets of the individual plus any loan that the individual could secure plus the
fulfillment of any labor contract would not cover the cost of the premium.
18. Insurance would be within the capacity of an individual to purchase yet unrea-
sonably expensive in cases such as those in which everyone has a slight chance of coming
down with a horrible disease that is curable only if enormously expensive medical tech-
nology is employed. If the cost of such an insurance premium entails the impoverishment
or indentured servitude of the individual, then such insurance would be unreasonably
expensive. Insurance would also be unreasonably expensive across a wide range of less
extreme cases.
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satisfy equality of resources in a different class of cases in which one
couldn’t (or couldn’t without great cost) avoid exposure to risk in the
absence of insurance. Such equal opportunity to insure would be suf-
ficient if reasonably and modestly priced insurance could fully com-
pensate any instance of brute bad luck. If in a certain community, for
example, persons suffer an equal and small risk that their personal
belongings will be destroyed by a tornado, then having an equal op-
portunity to insure against such destruction might satisfy equality of
resources even if no one could, except at great cost, avoid having any
personal belongings or avoid keeping these personal belongings above
ground rather than in a storm cellar. Such equal risk of loss would not
pose a threat to equality of resources if each person had the opportunity
fully to protect him or herself against such risk by purchasing reasonably
and modestly priced insurance that would fully compensate losses of
personal belongings resulting from tornados. In this case, it would be
appropriate to attribute any losses to option luck alone.
Unlike the above cases involving material possessions, it is, unfor-
tunately, often impossible to protect against such things as severe phys-
ical and mental incapacitation in this way. In such cases of incapacitation,
it could easily be the case that no affordable or reasonable insurance
policy would be available that would come close to compensating the
harm fully. If all of an incapacitated person’s options are very bad, both
in absolute terms and relative to the value of the options of others, then
he or she would have a justified complaint of unfairness even though
he or she had an equal opportunity to insure and had rationally chosen
that option which is least bad. The range of options open to someone
who, for example, eventually goes blind or insane (e.g., going blind or
insane without having purchased insurance, going blind or insane after
having purchased reasonably priced insurance that only partially com-
pensates, or going blind or insane after having purchased insurance
that fully compensates but is unreasonably expensive) would be inad-
equate to justify the claim that the choice such a person makes regarding
insurance transforms his or her harm from a case of bad brute luck
into an unproblematic case of good or bad option luck. It might, of
course, be rational for such a person to purchase some insurance against
blindness or insanity even though the level of relief that the insurance
provides does not fully compensate the harm. It might, as Dworkin
suggests, be rational to purchase insurance that would cover the cost
of aids and training in the event that one goes blind.19 But if no insur-
ance policy that it would be reasonable to purchase would come close
to compensating the harm fully, then the fact that people who will suffer
the brute bad luck of going blind or insane previously found it reason-
19. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 2, p. 76.
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able to buy some amount of insurance against blindness or insanity does
not eliminate the bad brute luck of going blind or insane by transform-
ing all of it into good or bad option luck. Bad brute luck remains, and
its differential effects must be neutralized if an envy-free distribution is
to be preserved.
If a government is committed to Dworkin’s theory of equality of
resources and, hence, to coming as close to the realization of an envy-
free distribution of personal and impersonal resources as possible, then
it must do more than provide an equal opportunity to insure when such
insurance is inadequate in the manner sketched in the previous para-
graph. It must make sure that those who are able-bodied are deprived of
impersonal resources and their resources are transferred to the severely
incapacitated until the point is reached at which no incapacitated person
prefers any able-bodied person’s bundle of personal and impersonal re-
sources to his or her own. Such redistribution should also aim for an
outcome in which no able-bodied person prefers any incapacitated per-
son’s bundle of personal and impersonal resources to his or her own.
Even when it is impossible, through monetary payment, fully to compen-
sate those who have been severely and incurably incapacitated, it will
almost always be possible to transfer enough resources from the able-
bodied to the incapacitated so that no incapacitated person would prefer
the bundles of the able-bodied to their own. For if one deprives the able-
bodied of resources to that point at which they are starving and dehy-
drated, one will probably reach a point at which even the most severely
incapacitated individuals who are nourished and otherwise well provi-
sioned would not prefer the bundles of the able-bodied to their own. We
cannot guarantee that the envy test will be satisfied by means of such
deprivation and transfer, since we cannot guarantee that no able-bodied
person who is so deprived will prefer the bundles of any of the incapac-
itated. We cannot even guarantee that, for any given pair of able-bodied
and incapacitated individuals, there is a point of deprivation and transfer
at which neither will prefer the bundle of the other. Nevertheless, it is
highly plausible to assume that in a population that includes the severely
incapacitated whom it is impossible or fantastically expensive to compen-
sate fully, the deprivation and transfer that achieves a state of mutually
shared misery would more closely approximate an envy-free distribution
of personal and impersonal resources than the compensation that Dwor-
kin’s insurance would award. Therefore, one who is committed to an
envy-free distribution which is the ambition of Dworkin’s theory of equal-
ity of resources should favor such extreme, leveling-down deprivation and
transfer over insurance.
This, I submit, is a highly unpalatable consequence of Dworkin’s
theory of equality of resources. How might Dworkin block this conse-
quence? In answering this question, I will first consider some relevant
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remarks of his in chapters 2, 3, and 6 of Sovereign Virtue and then consider
some of his more recent reflections on insurance in chapter 9 of that
work.
Dworkin acknowledges in chapter 2 that he is vulnerable to the
“powerful complaint” that the redistribution called for by insurance is
insufficient to bring about an envy-free distribution of personal and
impersonal resources.20 He says that “I do not doubt that . . . arguments
can be found” which would recommend the erasing of even more dif-
ferences than would be called for by insurance.21 But he says that “it is
hard to anticipate how great a motive we should have to search for
further arguments” once we have redistributed to that degree which is
called for by insurance. He suggests that our motivation might be lacking
because “it might be that the costs in overall efficiency of even those
features [of redistribution called for by insurance] would be so great
that those who are prepared to compromise equality of resources . . .
for general utility . . . would argue that even that much equality would
be condemned by their more embracing conception of justice.”22
This line of response could be motivated as follows. One could
concede that the particular aspect of justice which is concerned with
distributive equality really does call for the extreme, leveling-down re-
distribution already described. This would be so if, for example, a com-
mitment to distributive equality were underpinned solely by the prin-
ciple that it is unfair that the circumstances of some, through no choice
of theirs, are less good than those of others.23 Such unfairness would
be minimized only by the leveling-down distribution described above.
But one could consistently also maintain that justice is by no means
exhausted by the call to minimize unfairness. The promotion of the
general welfare is also an element of justice, one which might come
into conflict with and outweigh the minimization of unfairness. The
sacrifice of the general welfare in the aforementioned leveling-down
case is sufficiently great that it outweighs the call to minimize unfairness.
On this approach, justice broadly conceived consists of the proper bal-
20. See ibid., pp. 102–9. Dworkin’s remarks here are specifically addressed to a scheme
of hypothetical insurance which is meant to address inequalities that arise from differences
in income that are traceable to differences in talent. This scheme differs in important
respects from an equal opportunity to insure against incapacity that I have been discussing
above. Nevertheless, I believe that his remarks generalize to a response to my claim that
an equal opportunity to insure against incapacity is insufficient to realize equality of
resources. All references of mine to “insurance” shall be to “an equal opportunity to insure
against incapacity” unless I indicate otherwise.
21. Ibid., p. 107.
22. Ibid., p. 106.
23. Compare Cohen’s formulation of the “primary egalitarian impulse” in G. A.
Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–44, p. 908.
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ancing of a plurality of distinct and potentially conflicting values or
principles such as distributive equality, utility, liberty, and the right not
to be sacrificed for the greater good.24
Dworkin, however, would not upon reflection be disposed to adopt
this line, and for the following two reasons. First, he maintains that equality
of resources is a requirement of what he calls the “sovereign virtue of
political community”: this sovereign virtue is an “equal concern for the
fate of all those citizens over whom [a government] claims dominion,”
and such “equal concern requires that government aim at a form of
material equality that I have called equality of resources.”25 Second, he is
opposed to the pluralism just described. He resists the notion that dis-
tributive equality is one of many values that must be traded off against
other values. It has been a perennial refrain of his over the past three
decades that two fundamental values that are thought to be at loggerheads
in modern society—liberty and equality—do not in fact conflict.26 Dworkin
has also advanced the more sweeping claim that the “particular concep-
tion of liberalism” that he defends “insists that liberty, equality, and com-
munity are not three distinct and often conflicting political virtues, as
other political theories both on the left and right of liberalism declare,
but complementary aspects of a single political vision, so that we cannot
secure or even understand any one of these three political ideals inde-
pendently of the others.”27 It follows from these two reasons that the
sovereign virtue of equal concern gives rise to the nonoverridden re-
quirement of equality of resources. Given that the ambition of equality
of resources, as noted earlier,28 is to ensure that no one envies anyone
else’s bundle of impersonal and personal resources, it therefore follows
that the sovereign virtue of equal concern gives rise to the nonoverridden
requirement to come as close as possible to the realization of an envy-
free distribution.
24. This proper balancing must, however, exclude certain considerations which seem
intuitively to be inimical to justice even if these considerations are relevant to the still
broader question of what, all things considered, is to be done. Cohen has persuasively
argued that justice might speak against the government’s giving in to the unjust demands
of individuals (e.g., kidnappers who demand a ransom or the talented rich who withhold
their talents for higher pay) even though the government ought, all things considered,
to give in to those demands. See Cohen, “Incentives, Inequality, and Community,” in The
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 13, ed. Grethe B. Peterson (Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press, 1992).
25. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, “Introduction,” pp. 1–3.
26. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1977), chap. 12, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985),
pp. 188–89, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 297–301,
and Sovereign Virtue, chap. 3.
27. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 6, p. 237.
28. See n. 9 above.
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An interpretative puzzle arises when one tries to reconcile this last
claim with Dworkin’s reflections upon insurance in chapter 9 of Sovereign
Virtue. There Dworkin argues that equal concern condemns the sort of
radical redistribution that would be called for by the leveling-down strat-
egy. More precisely, he condemns a “rescue principle” which calls upon
society to do as much as possible for the least well-off, no matter how
costly. He notes that no society could honor this principle “without
crippling itself.” Insofar as a society applies this principle to those who
are seriously ill or incapacitated, it “would have to spend so much on
medical care that it would have nothing left with which it might try to
make the lives of its members—the unlucky as well as lucky—good as
well as long.”29 Dworkin maintains that the provision of an equal op-
portunity for all to insure against risk, and not the rescue principle,
would provide “the ideal way” of showing equal concern for all.30
The interpretative puzzle arises when we recall that there are cir-
cumstances in which the extreme, leveling-down redistribution would
more closely approximate an envy-free distribution of personal and im-
personal resources than would the less-radical redistribution which an
equal opportunity to insure would call for. Hence, Dworkin appears to
be committed to the claim that the sovereign virtue of equal concern
both does and does not give rise to the requirement to come as close
as possible to the realization of an envy-free distribution.
One solution to this interpretative puzzle would be to show that
insurance does in fact, contrary to my argument above, most closely
approximate an envy-free distribution. Consider the following argument
that insurance really does come closest to satisfying the envy test. Sup-
pose that the “appropriate version of the envy test” consists of the fol-
lowing ex ante application of that test. The envy test would be applied
to the insurance policies that each individual holds at the time of pur-
chase and before it is known whether he or she will need to collect on
that policy. Given that each had an equal opportunity to insure, nobody
would have any reason at that point to prefer to have purchased the
different insurance policy that anybody else has purchased. Equality of
resources would, on this line of argument, be satisfied by virtue of this
ex ante envy-free distribution even though inequalities in the circum-
stances of individuals subsequently arise. This case might be considered
analogous to a case in which two people possess equal personal and
impersonal resources at the outset, yet one chooses to invest all of his
or her savings in stock X, whereas the other chooses to invest all of his
or her savings in stock Y. Equality of resources is preserved in this latter
case even if one goes on to win a fortune and the other loses nearly
29. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 9, p. 341.
30. Ibid., pp. 341–42.
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everything. Perhaps this is so by virtue of the fact that their circumstances
are ex ante equal in the following respect: before they knew how their
stocks would fare, neither would have swapped his or her stock portfolio
with the other’s.31
I do not think the ex ante strategy succeeds in reconciling equality
of resources with the inequalities that arise ex post. In order to explain
why it does not, I would first like to draw attention to the fact that there
is ex ante equality even in the absence of insurance in any set of cir-
cumstances in which, ceteris paribus, each individual knows that he or
she has the same probability of suffering bad luck as anybody else.
Suppose, for the purpose of illustration, that people are identical in
their personal and impersonal resources at the beginning of their adult
lives. Moreover, they each have the same known and greater than zero
but less than one hundred percent chance of developing a horrible
mental illness later in life. This illness is such that nothing can be done
to cure it, treat it, alleviate one’s suffering from it, or otherwise com-
pensate one for it. Since nothing can be done, insurance against this
illness is impossible. Would the ideal of equality of resources be realized
in the absence of insurance simply by virtue of the fact that these
people’s chances of coming down with this illness are known to be ex
ante equal? It would not, as those who come down with this illness will,
through no choice of theirs, enjoy a severely diminished stock of per-
sonal resources over their lifetimes in comparison with those who are
spared this ailment. Now suppose that it becomes possible, at a steep
premium, to purchase insurance against this illness, but this insurance
would cover nothing more than a very expensive but minimally effective
new treatment which succeeds in making the effects of this illness only
very slightly less horrible. Would the possibility of purchasing such neg-
ligible insurance be sufficient to transform a state of affairs which is
manifestly not one of equality of resources into one in which the ideal
of equality of resources has been realized? Once again, it would not.
To see why it would not, let us suppose that a subsequent medical
breakthrough gives rise to an inexpensive miracle cure to this illness
which is free of side effects, and that inexpensive insurance becomes
available which would cover the cost of such a cure. Surely one would
be entitled to say that, with this breakthrough, we now possess the means
to bring society much closer to (indeed fully to realize) the ideal of
equality of resources. Hence the ex ante view must be rejected, since
one would not be entitled to say this if one thought that ex ante equality
were sufficient to realize the ideal of equality of resources. By hypothesis,
31. See ibid., chap. 2, p. 76, where Dworkin proposes an ex ante application of the
envy test to illustrate how the test might be satisfied in the case of those whose holdings
differ as the result of voluntary gambles.
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the circumstances of the individuals were ex ante equal before the advent
of the miracle cure, when people could not purchase adequate insur-
ance to protect themselves against this illness. Hence, on the ex ante
view, society will already have realized the ideal of equality of resources
even before the advent of the miracle cure, and therefore the medical
breakthrough could not bring society closer to the realization of this
ideal. This critique of the ex ante view reinforces the earlier moral of
my story, which is that an equal opportunity to insure is insufficient to
bring about equality of resources whenever no insurance policy exists
that would be reasonable to purchase and that would fully compensate
the harm.
Even when no such policy exists, and insurance provides hardly any
protection against severe brute bad luck, justice might nevertheless call
for that distribution which arises when each is given an equal opportunity
to insure rather than a leveling-down distribution which would realize
equality of resources. To return to an earlier theme, however, this would
be because justice encompasses a plurality of potentially conflicting values
and principles, of which distributive equality is only one among others,
none of which is lexically prior. An equal opportunity to insure might
plausibly be regarded as that policy which strikes the proper balance
between the competing considerations, among others, of distributive
equality and utility. But it cannot always plausibly be regarded as that
policy which realizes distributive equality considered on its own rather
than in combination with the full range of values and principles which
jointly and disharmoniously constitute the more encompassing virtue of
justice.
II
I would now like to turn to a consideration of brute bad luck in one’s
circumstances that arises from the choices of others with respect to the
disposition of their resources in the form of gifts and bequests. Dworkin
notes that it “is bad luck to be born into a relatively poor family or a
family that is selfish or spendthrift.”32 As above, Dworkin proposes com-
pensation modeled on insurance as the egalitarian remedy for this sort
of brute bad luck. He maintains that inheritance and gifts should be
regulated by a tax modeled on a hypothetical insurance market in which
people deprived of information concerning the wealth and generosity of
their parents would be asked how much insurance, if any, they would
purchase against receiving less than a specified amount. Members of
society would be required to pay a tax on wealth that they transfer in the
form of gifts and bequests which is equal to the cost of the premium of
the insurance policy that the average person who is deprived of infor-
32. Ibid., chap. 9, p. 347.
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mation would have purchased. The revenue from such a tax would com-
pensate those who turn out to receive gifts and bequests that are worth
less than the amount specified by the average person. Dworkin believes
that the average person would favor a premium which would justify a tax
at a “steeply progressive rate” on the value of any gifts or bequests that
people make: “The premium rate rises steeply from zero in the case of
modest gifts or a modest estate to a very high marginal proportion of
very great wealth.”33 Such a tax scheme would not, of course, result in
the equalization of the amount of resources that parents pass on to their
children, even though it would greatly reduce the inequalities that are
permitted in most contemporary societies. Some children would be able,
under such a scheme, to begin their adult lives with more wealth than
other children, not as the result of their different choices from an equal
starting point but because of the unequal generosity of their parents. This
would frustrate Dworkin’s ambition to realize an envy-free distribution of
personal and impersonal resources. Once again, therefore, the redistri-
bution called for by Dworkinian insurance would be insufficient to realize
equality of resources. In this case, one could realize an envy-free distri-
bution only through the extremely strict regulation of gifts and bequests
which would be necessary to ensure that nobody benefits to a greater
degree from such gifts or bequests than anyone else.34
Dworkin maintains that his “desert island auction would not have
avoided envy, and would have no appeal as a solution to the problem
of dividing the resources equally, if the immigrants had struggled ashore
with different amounts of money in their pockets at the outset, which
they were free to use in the auction, or if some had stolen clamshells
from others.”35 For similar reasons, Dworkin cannot allow participants
33. Ibid., p. 348.
34. This fact follows from the more general fact that unregulated nonmarket trans-
actions and transfers will almost inevitably disrupt an initially envy-free distribution. To
see why, consider the following example borrowed from Hal Varian. Imagine three people
with equal initial endowments of impersonal resources. The first two are twins who have
identical tastes, while the third person has different tastes. If the third person trades
exclusively with the first twin, making them both better off, the second twin will envy the
first since they both have the same preferences. The same would be true if the third
person gives only the first twin a gift. Market exchanges, on the other hand, will satisfy
the envy test “because the market mechanism is itself a symmetric mechanism in the sense
that everyone faces the same prices and thus has the same opportunities to trade. In this
sense the market mechanism . . . provides the special property of preserving the symmetry
of the initial endowment” (Hal Varian, “Dworkin on Equality of Resources,” Economics and
Philosophy 1 [1985]: 110–25, p. 114).
35. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chap. 2, p. 70. Dworkin employs such an auction in
chap. 2 to illustrate his theory of equality of resources. He asks us to suppose that “a
number of [propertyless] shipwreck survivors are washed up on a desert island which has
abundant resources and no native population.” We are to imagine that one of the survivors
is elected to distribute to each an equal and large amount of clamshells that serve as
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in the auction to give away clamshells to others. He cannot, for example,
allow ascetics or altruists to give most of their initial equal share of
clamshells to their relatives before the auction begins. Such nonmarket
transfers would immediately frustrate the goal of realizing an envy-free
distribution. But if, as surely he must, Dworkin would prohibit such
transfers from ascetics and altruists to their relatives, then he also must,
on pain of inconsistency, also prohibit or otherwise severely regulate
parental gifts or bequests that would result in children beginning their
adult lives with unequal shares.
It is a telling criticism of Dworkin’s scheme of hypothetical insur-
ance to regulate the amount of money that parents pass on to their
children that an analogous scheme of insurance would be wholly in-
adequate as a response to a scenario which is akin to that which Dworkin
imagines, in which shipwreck survivors enter the auction with highly
unequal numbers of clamshells. Suppose that their clamshell holdings
are unequal because all the clamshells have been divided at the outset
into unequal piles that will randomly be assigned to the survivors. Before
their fates are determined, they are given the opportunity to insure
against failing to receive less than whatever number of clamshells they
specify. The premium is to be fixed as an increasing percentage of the
number of clamshells that the policy owner will turn out to have. Sur-
vivors might well find it prudent to insure only against ending up with
less than a fairly low number of clamshells, since insuring against ending
up with less than a high level of clamshells might not be worth the high
cost of the premium.36 If it is prudent to insure only at a low level, then
the inadequacy of insurance as a device to realize an envy-free initial
distribution of clamshells should be self-evident. Insurance might pro-
tect people from the bleak prospect of bidding with few or no clamshells.
But significant disparities in clamshell holdings would remain, and these
disparities would frustrate the envy test. The envy-cleansing solution to
differences in brute luck in this example is not insurance; rather, it is
government redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky until the point
at which the lucky do not prefer their bundles to those of the unlucky.
Such a solution would be achieved if the government redistributed until
everyone possessed an equal number of clamshells.
money and to list each distinct item on the island (including parcels of land) as a lot to
be sold. “The auctioneer then proposes a set of prices for each lot and discovers whether
that set of prices clears all markets, that is, whether there is only one purchaser at that
price and all lots are sold. If not, then the auctioneer adjusts his prices until he reaches
a set that does clear the markets.” At the conclusion of the auction, according to Dworkin,
“no one will envy another’s set of purchases because, by hypothesis, he could have pur-
chased that bundle with his clamshells instead of his own bundle” (ibid., pp. 66–68).
36. On the prudence of insuring only at a low level, see ibid., pp. 96–99, and chap.
9, pp. 334–35.
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Since, as I have argued, only severe regulation of gifts and bequests
would satisfy the ambition of equality of resources of realizing an envy-
free distribution, there exists an unavoidable conflict between certain
familiar liberal freedoms and Dworkin’s ideal of equality of resources.
This conflict must be resolved by balancing the concern to reach an
envy-free distribution against an independent concern to leave people
free to benefit others. A fundamental question that those who value
equality must confront is the extent to which the pursuit of distributive
equality is worth the unavoidable sacrifice of freedom and other values
that such pursuit entails. I hope to have shown in this and the previous
section of this article that those who share Dworkin’s egalitarian sym-
pathies cannot avoid making trade-offs in order to resolve a clash among
the plural and conflicting values of distributive equality, liberty, and
utility.
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